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I. INTRODUCION

Generally stated, the economic loss rule prohibits the buyer of a
product or service from recovering in tort for economic loss when there
has been no personal injury or damage to other property.1 Within the
* Editor'sNote: This Note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student Note submitted in the Spring 1995 semester.
** Special thanks to Hal Anderson, David Barksdale, and Matt Rosin.
1. Greenberg v. Mount Sinai Medical Ctr., 629 So. 2d 252,255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). The
economic loss rule does not affect tort actions for economic loss resulting from personal injury.
See id. Therefore, the rule does not apply to tort damages such as loss of future earnings that
stem from personal injury. See id Also, the rule does not apply to economic loss from damage
to property other than the product itself. See Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n v. Charley Toppino &
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past ten years, Florida has embraced this rule,2 dismissing claims based
on fraud,' conversion,4 and breach of fiduciary duty,5 when the
Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1246, 1247 (Fla. 1993). Property other than the product itself, often
called "other property," is defined as property that is completely separate from the purchased
product. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986).
To determine whether something is other property, the Florida Supreme Court has stated that
"one must look to the product purchased by the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defendant."
Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247 (citing King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3d Cir.
1988)). Under this rule, component parts of a product would not be considered other property
even if supplied by a different manufacturer. See id. Applying this rule, the Casa Clara court
found that structural steel damaged by faulty concrete was not other property because the steel
and concrete were part of one complete unit-a home. See id. Similarly, the East River Court
held that turbines damaged by defectively designed turbine components were not other property
because the turbine and components were sold as an integrated package. East River, 476 U.S.
at 867. For a case holding that the damaged property was other property, see E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Finks Farms, 656 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that tomato
plants and land damaged by a chemical supplied by the defendant were other property, and the
plaintiff was therefore able to recover economic damages in tort).
2. See, e.g., AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 180 (Fla.
1987) (services); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 90102 (Fla. 1987) (goods). The economic loss rule has also been embraced by a majority of
jurisdictions. William K. Jones, ProductDefects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of
Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, app. at 799-803 (1990) (listing cases adopting
the rule). However, jurisdictions vary over which exceptions should apply to the rule. Exceptions
recognized in some jurisdictions allow purely economic loss recovery when (1) an act of
negligence is imminently dangerous to the lives or safety of others or the property at issue is
inherently dangerous, Fleischer v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 832, 835
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993); (2) there is fraud or collusion, id.; (3) attorney malpractice is involved,
Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ill. 1992); and (4) an architect or engineer acting
in a supervisory role economically harms a general contractor, Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v.
Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. 1995); Jim's Excavating Serv. v. HKM Assocs., 878
P.2d 248, 255 (Mont. 1994). This Note focuses only on the last exception.
3. See, e.g., Hoseline, Inc. v. U.S.A. Diversified Prods., 40 F.3d 1198, 1199-200 (11th
Cir. 1994) (holding that Florida's economic loss rule barred a manufacturer from recovering
purely economic damages when the manufacturer's claim that the defendant fraudulently shipped
less plastic conduit than the manufacturer ordered arose from the defendant's breach of its
contract to ship certain quantities of the conduit).
Other courts also have precluded fraud claims. See, e.g., Kee v. National Reserve Life Ins.
Co., 918 F.2d 1538, 1540, 1543, 1544 (1Ith Cir. 1990) (using Florida's economic loss rule to
uphold summary judgment entered against a counterclaimant's fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty claims); American Eagle Credit Corp. v. Select Holding, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 800, 816 (S.D.
Fla. 1994) (using Florida's economic loss rule to preclude recovery on fraud claim of financing
company/lessor that had disbursed money to an equipment manufacturer based on the lessee's
fraudulent representation that the equipment had been inspected and approved); Serina v.
Albertson's, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (using Florida's economic loss rule
to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff s fraud claim); J. Batten
Corp. v. Oakridge Invs. 85, Ltd., 546 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (using the economic
loss rule to preclude a contractor's fraud claim against a defendant who allegedly promised the
contractor that he would pay the contractor the amount due under their contract if the contractor
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plaintiffs suffered only monetary damage.6 Florida courts have used this
rule to bar claims even when injured plaintiffs are without any other
remedy,7 and when their injuries were wantonly inflicted.8
would complete construction).
Despite precluding fraud in the performance claims based on the economic loss rule,
courts have allowed fraud in the inducement claims to stand because the inducement takes place
prior to any contractual agreement. See, e.g., Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 772 F.
Supp. 1225, 1237-38 (N.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that because fraud in the inducement addresses
a situation where one party is tricked into contracting, it addresses precontractual conduct which
is recognized as a tort); Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp.
1566, 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (citing Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1989) for the proposition that fraud in the performance is not actionable as a tort where
there is only economic loss, but fraud in the inducement is an independent tort which is
actionable even for purely economic loss).
4. See, e.g., Leisure Founders, Inc. v. CUC Int'l, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1562, 1573-74 (S.D.
Fla. 1993) (holding that shareholders could not sue purchasers for economic loss under
conversion theory where the shareholders and purchasers were in a contractual relationship and
where the same actions that constituted the alleged conversion also constituted nonperformance
of the contract); Burger King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1012 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(holding that under Florida law, franchisee could not recover under conversion for monetary loss
after the franchisor failed to purchase advertising with advertising money collected from the
franchisee); Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490, 494-96 (3d DCA 1994)
(holding that the economic loss rule barred a mortgagor from recovering under conversion the
post-default rents to which the mortgagor allegedly was entitled, but which were allegedly
diverted to the personal use of the mortgagee-partnerships' general partner), review denied, 659
So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1995).
5. See Interstate See. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769, 776-77 (11th Cir. 1991) (using
the economic loss rule to preclude a corporation from recovering monies lost because of
stockbroker's alleged breach of fiduciary duty). But see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland &
Knight, 832 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that the Resolution Trust Corporation
could sue a law firm for breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice which resulted in purely
economic loss because the breach of fiduciary duty claim was in essence a malpractice claim,
which is at root both a tort and a contract claim); Collins, 607 N.E.2d at 1187 (holding that a
client could bring legal malpractice claim for purely economic damages despite the economic
loss rule because it is inappropriate for clients to have to bargain for a guarantee or warranty
against malpractice).
For critical commentary on the Interstate decision, see James G. Dodrill H, Casenote,
Interstate Securities Corp. v. Hayes Corp.: Should the Economic Loss Doctrine Apply to Actions
Against Fiduciaries?,47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1193 (1993).
6. If the plaintiff is in a contractual relationship with the defendant, the plaintiff can
recover monetary damages if he or she can prove a tort separate and independent from economic
loss due to breach of contract. See, e.g., John Brown Automation, Inc. v. Nobles, 537 So. 2d
614, 617-18 (2d DCA 1988) (holding that negligent misrepresentation made by machineproducing company that it had all the parts necessary for the operation of a machine was not
a tort separate and independent from a breach of the contract because the misrepresentation was
"inherent in and inextricable from the events constituting [the] breach"), review denied, 547 So.
2d 1210 (Fla. 1989).
7. See, e.g., Airport Rent-A-Car, 660 So. 2d at 631; Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n v. Charley
Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 1993) (Barkett, C.J., dissenting in part). Prior
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Florida courts have used the economic loss rule to exclude these
otherwise valid tort claims9 in order to foster a distinction between tort
to 1993, Florida courts provided a "no alternative remedy" exception to the rule. See Latite
Roofing Co. v. Urbanek, 528 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). However, the Florida
Supreme Court expressly overruled Latite in Casa Clara. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248
(Barkett, C.J., dissenting in part). The plaintiffs in Casa Clara were homeowners whose homes
were "literally crumbling around them" because of the allegedly faulty concrete supplied by the
defendant. Id. (Barkett, C.J., dissenting in part). The homeowners could not recover under breach
of implied warranty because they were not in privity with the defendant. Id. (Barkett, C.J.,
dissenting in part). Also, the homeowners could not sue under the Florida Building Codes Act
because the Act did not apply to material suppliers like the defendant. Id. (Barkett, C.J.,
dissenting in part). Finally, they could not recover under a tort theory due to the economic loss
rule. Id. at 1248. In her partial dissent, Chief Justice Barkett noted that denying the homeowners'
tort claim was unacceptable in light of the principle underlying the Florida Constitution's court
access provision: wrongs must have remedies absent compelling, countervailing public policies.
Id. (Barkett, C.J., dissenting in part) (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21).
One year after Casa Clara, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: "WHETHER, UNDER FLORIDA
LAW, THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES TO NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FOR THE
MANUFACTURE OF A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT WHERE THE ONLY DAMAGES
CLAIMED ARE TO THE PRODUCT ITSELF AND WHERE THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS TO
HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF RECOVERY." Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost
Car, Inc., 18 F.3d 1555, 1559 (1lth Cir. 1994). The Florida Supreme Court answered this
question in the affirmative, stating that "the economic loss rule cannot be circumvented by the
no alternative theory of recovery exception." Airport Rent-A-Car, 660 So. 2d at 631.
Some commentators argue that a "no alternative remedy" exception would "undercut the
very foundation of the doctrine [because] the economic loss doctrine is aimed at encouraging
parties to negotiate for warranty protection or to take other steps, such as purchasing insurance,
to protect their purely economic interests." Lynn E. Wagner & Richard A. Solomon, The
Supreme Court of FloridaEnds the Confusion Surrounding the Economic Loss Doctrine, FLA.
B.J., May 1994, at 46, 51.
8. See, e.g., Kingston Square, 792 F. Supp. at 1575 (using the economic loss rule to
preclude a negligence and wanton conduct claim).
In Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1982), the Florida Supreme Court answered the
following certified question in the affirmative:
"WHERE THE DEFENDANT FLAGRANTLY, UNJUSTIFIABLY, AND
OPPRESSIVELY BREACHES A CONTRACT, AND ATTEMPTS TO CONCEAL
THE BREACH BY THE CRIMINAL ACT OF MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS
TO THE GOVERNMENT, MUST THE PLAINTIFFS PLEAD AND PROVE
THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED AN INDEPENDENT TORT
[INDEPENDENT OF BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTIONS] AGAINST THEM
IN ORDER TO RECOVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES?"
Id. at 223, 225.
9. Because the economic loss rule precludes otherwise valid tort claims, it has been
described as a "powerful defense." Timothy J. Muldowney, Architects, Engineers and
ConstructionLitigation: Economic Loss Doctrine, 60 DEF. COUNs. J. 356, 356 (1993).
The economic loss rule has been a successful procedural device at the motion to dismiss and

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss5/2

4

Duffy: The Economic Loss Rule and Florida's Exception for General Contra
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE

and contract law.' ° The distinction rests on the different allocations of
risk in each body of law.' On one hand, tort law burdens society
generally with the costs of tort compensation. 2 Historically, the
judiciary has allocated risks of bodily or property injury through tort law
because private agreements cannot effectively accomplish the task. 3
Purely economic loss has not been included in this societal scheme on
the theory that society in general should not bear the economic losses
of private parties. 4
Contract law, on the other hand, effectively allocates purely
economic loss.' 5 Contract law is well suited to commercial
controversies because the parties can set the terms of their

motion for summary judgment stages. See, e.g., Serina v. Albertson's, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1113,
1118 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (using Florida's economic loss rule to grant the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff's fraud claim); Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 1537, 1540 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (using the economic loss rule to grant plaintiff's motion to
dismiss count of defendant's counterclaim alleging breach of duty to segregate funds); City of
Tampa v. Thomton-Tomasetti, P.C., 646 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (affirming
dismissal of the city of Tampa's multi-million dollar tort claim against nonprivity subcontractor);
E.C. Goldman, Inc. v. A/R/C Assocs., 543 So. 2d 1268, 1273 (5th DCA) (affirming judgment
on the pleadings against plaintiff who sued in negligence for economic loss), review denied, 551
So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1989).
10. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245-46. See generally Jay M. Feinman, The
Jurisprudenceof Classification,41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989) (discussing the consequences and
purposes of doctrinal classification, particularly in regards to the boundary drawn between tort
and contract). For a thorough analysis of economic loss rule policies of other states, see David
B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C., 61 IND. L.J. 593 (1986).
11. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245-46; Florida Bldg. Inspection Servs. v. Arnold Corp.,
660 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (en banc).
12. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245-46.
13. Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352-53 (2d DCA
1992), review denied, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1993). Noting that the law of negligence has been
influenced by the theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, the Sandaraccourt stated:
In a democracy, the social contract is an agreement between the members of
society by which each member undertakes duties in consideration for the benefit
received when all members fulfill similar duties. Although the analogy can be
overstated, through the law of negligence, the judiciary has written an express
"social contract" with limited remedies to protect interests not adequately protected
in private contracts.
Id. at 1353 n.4. The Sandarac court also stated that whether an interest is protected, under
common law tradition, is a matter of law decided by the court when it determines whether a
duty exists. Id. at 1352 (citing McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla.
1992)).
14. See Airport Rent-A-Car, 660 So. 2d at 630; Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247.
15. See Sandarac,609 So. 2d at 1353.
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agreements.' 6 Thus, while tort law seeks to compensate society
members for bodily harm or property injury," contract law seeks to
protect contracting parties' economic expectations. 8 The economic loss
rule is a tort doctrine that accounts for the differences between tort and
contract by precluding tort compensation for purely economic harm,
based on the belief that the general public " 'should [not] bear the cost
of [purely] economic losses sustained by those who failed to bargain for
adequate contract remedies.' ""
Under this rationale, the rule encourages parties in a contractual
relationship to define the limitations of economic loss liability through
bargaining, risk acceptance, and compensation." Without question, this
rule serves its purpose in defective product cases where the only harm
is the purchaser's monetary loss from the product's malfunction." If
the courts allowed the purchaser to recover under tort in such a case,
warranty law would become redundant.22 In effect, the courts would be
creating a "tort warranty" distinct from any bargained-for contractual
warranty. However, the rule is not as clearly justified when the
parties are not in privity because the parties probably did not have the
opportunity to engage in economic loss bargaining.24 Consequently,
16. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872-73 (1986).
17. See Sandarac, 609 So. 2d at 1352-53.
18. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246. The Casa Clara court stated that "[for recovery in
tort 'there must be a showing of harm above and beyond disappointed expectations. A buyer's
desire to enjoy the benefit of his bargain is not an interest that tort law traditionally protects.'
Id. (quoting Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (11. 1982)).
19. Id. at 1247 (quoting Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for
Construction Defects: A CriticalAnalysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 933 (1989)). There are several
other plausible explanations for the different treatment of economic loss and physical injury. See
Gaebler, supra note 10, at 610-20. One such explanation is that economic interests are simply
not worthy of protection against negligence because the "integrity" of such interests is less
important than the "integrity" of the body and tangible property. Id. at 610. Perhaps the most
satisfactory explanation, according to Gaebler, is the fear of virtually open-ended liability for
the indirect economic repercussions of negligence. Id. at 611-13.
20. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987);
infra text accompanying notes 67-83, 100-04.
21. Addressing the importance of risk allocation in contract, the East River Court stated
that "the failure of the product to function properly ... is the essence of a warranty action,
through which a contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain." East River, 476
U.S. at 868.
22. See id. at 867 (citing Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623
P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981)); Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247 (citing East River, 476 U.S. at
866).
23. The term "tort warranty" was used by two authors to describe the effect of not having
an economic loss rule. See Wagner & Solomon, supra note 7, at 53.
24. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting). The Florida Supreme
Court has characterized "privity" as a word used to describe the relationship of persons who are
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economically injured parties not in privity with wrongdoers traditionally
have posed a problem for Florida courts applying the economic loss
rule.25
After several district courts wrote conflicting opinions about the
application of the economic loss rule in nonprivity settings, 26 the
Florida Supreme Court clarified the issue. In a 1993 case, Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 27 the court held that
the economic loss rule applied to parties who were not in contractual
privity. 8 In doing so, the court made a deliberate policy choice to
extend the rule beyond contracting parties. 9
Unfortunately, Florida courts have not applied this choice
consistently. While generally using the economic loss rule to bar tort
parties to a contract. Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d
1378, 1379-80 (Fla. 1993) (citing Baskerville-Donovan Eng'rs, Inc. v. Pensacola Executive
House Condo. Ass'n, 581 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Fla. 1991)).
25. See Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5, 7-9 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
One Florida Supreme Court justice has noted that the economic loss rule "works well when the
loss is suffered by one who is privy to [a] contract... [and] works a mischief... where...
the injured party is not privy to the contract. .. ." Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1249 (Shaw, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
Florida's economic loss rule is based on a policy decision to have parties allocate risks
through contract. See infra text accompanying notes 99-104. On the other hand, the privity
doctrine is based on a policy to prevent disproportionate and indeterminate liability. See
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (refusing to allow economic loss
recovery to nonprivity parties for fear that it would subject the defendant to liability "in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class"). This rule later was
relaxed, allowing recovery for specially identifiable and foreseeable nonprivity classes rather
than completely barring nonprivity classes from recovery. See John A. Siliciano, Negligent
Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1929, 1936 (1988).
In its first case discussing the economic loss rule, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the
rule has a long, historic basis originating with the privity doctrine, which precluded recovery of
economic losses under tort theories to parties not in privity of contract. Florida Power & Light
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 1987).
26. Compare E.C. Goldman, Inc. v. A/R/C Assocs., 543 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA
1989) (holding that a roofer could not recover economic loss in negligence caused by nonprivity
consultants) with Latite Roofing Co. v. Urbanek, 528 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
(holding that a building buyer could sue a roofing company in negligence for purely economic
loss caused by negligent roof construction despite the absence of privity between the buyer and
the roofing company), overruledby Casa Clara,620 So. 2d at 1248.
27. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
28. See id. at 1248. Specifically, the court held that the plaintiff homeowners could not
recover purely monetary damages because of the economic loss rule, even though the
homeowners had never contracted with the wrongdoer. See id. The Florida Supreme Court
reiterated the Casa Claraholding in Airport Rent-A-Car, when it held that a rental car company
could not recover economic loss in tort from a nonprivity manufacturer. See AirportRent-A-Car,
660 So. 2d at 630-32.
29. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245-47.
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claims, regardless of privity," Florida courts have not used the rule to
bar general construction contractors' tort claims against nonprivity
supervising architects and engineers for purely economic loss.?
Therefore, a general contractor in Florida may sue an owner's architect
under negligence for purely economic loss.32 Does allowing the
contractor to sue in tort necessarily dictate that society in general must
pay for the economic losses of a general contractor?33
30. See, e.g., id. at 1248.
31. See, e.g., Southland Construction, 642 So. 2d at 7-9.
32. A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1973). Instead of overruling
Moyer, the Casa Claracourt limited Moyer to its facts. Casa Clara,620 So. 2d at 1248 n.9. The
exception applies only when the architect or engineer acts in a supervisory role. See Airport
Rent-A-Car, 660 So. 2d at 631; Sandarac, 609 So. 2d at 1354.
Courts have narrowly interpreted the Moyer exception. See, e.g., City of Tampa v. ThorntonTomasetti, P.C., 646 So. 2d 279, 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In Thornton-Tomasetti, the City of
Tampa hired architects and a construction company to build the Tampa Bay Performing Arts
Center. Id. at 280. In turn, the architects hired consultants to assist in the design of the building.
Id. During construction, problems arose from errors in the plans and specifications, causing the
construction company to halt work on several occasions. Id. The construction company
subsequently sued the city for $20,000,000 in damages caused by the delays. Id. at 280-81. The
city ultimately settled with the construction company for $9,500,000. Id. at 281. The city sought
to recover its loss by suing the architects and their consultants under negligence and breach of
contract theories. Id. The trial court originally allowed the negligence claim against the
consultants to stand despite the economic loss rule. Id. After the city filed an amended
complaint, the consultants again attacked the negligence claim using the economic loss rule. Id.
This time, the trial court dismissed the negligence claim. id. The court recognized the
inconsistency or apparent inconsistency of its rulings, explaining that although the economic loss
rule is stated with ease, it is applied with great difficulty. Id. (citing Sandarac, 609 So. 2d at
1352).
The appellate court affirmed this decision, id. at 283, suggesting that the Moyer exception
only applies when there is "an extremely close nexus" between defendant and plaintiff. Id. at
282. Here, there was not a close nexus between the city and the consultants. Id. The architects,
not the consultants, were responsible for coordinating the work of designers, and thus, only the
architects were answerable to the city. Id.
Furthermore, it appears that the exception is limited strictly to general contractors. See
Spancrete, Inc. v. Ronald E. Frazier & Assocs., 630 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
(holding that a subcontractor could not bring a negligence action against a supervising architect
for economic loss because the Moyer exception can only be used by general contractors).
33. In Sandarac, the court stated:
When the judiciary creates a ...

duty in negligence to protect economic

interests, . . . it should be aware that it is not merely creating an exception to an
existing common law rule of damages. It should be convinced that the problem
justifies a judicial allocation of the relevant risks among the members of society,
and that an adequate remedy cannot realistically exist through private contracts and
statutory remedies.
Sandarac,609 So. 2d at 1353.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss5/2

8

Duffy: The Economic Loss Rule and Florida's Exception for General Contra
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE

This Note argues that this exception in Florida is not sound in light
of the economic loss rule's purpose. Specifically, this Note asserts that
society should not be expected to bear the economic risks of a general
contractor, especially because the contractor has adequate remedies
under contract law. As background, part II reviews the origin and
development of the economic loss rule in Florida law, and discusses the
exception for general contractors. Part 1H presents problems with this
exception and poses alternatives that make the exception unnecessary.
Part IV concludes that Florida courts should abolish the exception in
favor of uniform application of the economic loss rule and its policies.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Early Economic Loss Recovery for
PartiesNot in Privity
Although the economic loss rule is not a new doctrine," the
34. The economic loss rule was first articulated by the California Supreme Court in a
products liability case, Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965) (en banc). In Seely,
the plaintiff purchased a truck for business purposes. i at 147. After driving the truck, the
plaintiff discovered that it bounced violently. Id. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to fix
the defect, the plaintiff sued the truck manufacturer for the payments he had made on the truck's
purchase price and for lost profits under a breach of express warranty theory. Id. at 147-48. The
court allowed recovery on the ground that the manufacturer had breached an express warranty.
Id. at 148. The court further found that the recovery for breach of warranty was not superseded
by the doctrine of strict liability in tort. Id. at 149. In the absence of the warranty, however, the
plaintiff would not have been able to recover. See id. at 150-51. The court explained:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries
and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the
"luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The
distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a
manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be
held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match
a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks
of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the
consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the
consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the
manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on
the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will
not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will.
Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for
physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone.
Id. at 151. Under this rationale, the plaintiff would not have been able to successfully sue under
strict liability for the payments he had made on the truck's purchase price or for lost profits. See
id. at 152.
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Florida Supreme Court did not specifically address its applicability until
1987." 5 Before this, the court allowed economic loss recovery through
The plaintiff also sued, on a strict liability theory, for damages sustained to the truck when
the truck's brakes failed and the truck overturned. Id. at 147, 152. The court agreed that the
doctrine of strict liability should be extended to encompass physical injury to the plaintiff's
property, but found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defect caused the physical damage
to the truck. Id. at 152.
The United States Supreme Court in the admiralty case of East River Steamship Corp. v.
TransamericaDelaval Inc. agreed for the most part with the line drawn in Seely. See East River,
476 U.S. at 866-71. In East River, a shipbuilding company contracted with the defendant to
design, manufacture, and supervise the installation of turbines in four supertankers. Id. at 859.
After the ships were completed, charterers took full control of the ships. Id. at 859-60. The
charterers experienced trouble with the turbines and subsequently sued the defendant for the cost
of repairing the ships and lost income while the ships were out of service. Id. at 860-61. The
charterers alleged that the defendant was strictly liable for design defects and liable in tort for
negligent supervision of the manufacturing process. Id. at 861.
The Court cited with approval the Seely court's statement that the distinction between tort
recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary. Id. at 871
(citing Seely, 403 P.2d at 151). Moreover, the Court agreed that tort protection for physical
injuries includes damage to some property. See id. at 867-68. However, the Court stopped short
of providing tort protection in one situation in which the Seely court seemingly would-when
the product injures only itself. Compare id. at 867-68, 871-75 ("When a product injures only
itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its
contractual remedies are strong.") with Seely, 403 P.2d at 152 ("Physical injury to property
[including the product] is so akin to personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing
them.").
The courts in both Seely and East River tried to draw a clear line between contract and tort
recovery. In establishing the proper scope for tort and contract recovery, the East River court
stressed:
Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial
controversies ... because the parties may set the terms of their own agreements.
The manufacturer can restrict its liability, within limits, by disclaiming warranties
or limiting remedies. In exchange, the purchaser pays less for the product. Since
a commercial situation generally does not involve large disparities in bargaining
power, we see no reason to intrude into the parties allocation of the risk.
East River, 476 U.S. at 872-73 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). Without this tort-contract
distinction, the East River Court recognized that contract law would "drown in a sea of tort."
Id. at 866 (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974)).
35. See Florida Power & Light v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
Prior to 1987, several Florida district courts of appeal used the economic loss rule to preclude
recovery. See GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350, 352 (3d DCA) (holding that plaintiff
could not use tort law to recover for purely economic loss sustained because of a defective
product), review denied, 453 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1984); Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. European
X-Ray Distribs., 444 So. 2d 1068, 1070-71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (affirming dismissal of count
alleging strict liability because no personal injury nor damage to other property resulted from
defective X ray equipment); Monsanto Agric. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla.
1st DCA 1982) (prohibiting plaintiff from recovering in negligence for economic loss sustained
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tort law in limited circumstances.36 In these older cases, the court did
not focus on the economic loss rule or its underlying policy of
separating tort and contract law. Rather, the court focused on the
concept of contract privity." For instance, in A.R. Moyer, Inc. v.
Graham,8 the Florida Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could recover
purely economic loss under a negligence theory despite lack of privity
with the defendant.39
In Moyer, the court answered the certified question of whether a
general contractor could sue a supervising architect or engineer for
negligent preparation of plans when the architect or engineer was not in
direct privity with the general contractor.' Even though the contractor
suffered only economic loss because of the allegedly faulty plans,4 the
court did not focus on the character of the harm. Instead, the court
discussed Florida's privity doctrine.42 Citing MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.43 and two previous Florida Supreme Court cases," the
Moyer court stated that the strictures of privity had been relaxed to
allow plaintiffs not in contract with the defendant to sue in
negligence.4" However, the parties in MacPhersonand the earlier cases
suffered bodily injury,46 unlike the general contractor who suffered
when herbicide did not perform as expected).
36. See, e.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d 467, 473 (Fla.
1984) (stating that purchasers of property, as intended and known beneficiaries of the sellers'
contract for abstract services, may recover damages from the abstract company for its negligent
performance); Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 402 (stating that a third-party general contractor who
sustained an economic loss proximately caused by an architect's negligent performance of a
contractual duty has a cause of action against the architect).
37. See FirstAmerican, 457 So. 2d at 468-71; Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 398-402. This Note
focuses mainly on cases involving negligently rendered services. In regard to defective products,
Florida courts also focused attention on contract privity instead of the underlying differences
between contract and tort. See James E. Tribble, The Role of Privity in Florida's Law of
Products Liability and the Economic Loss Doctrine: A Retrospective and Prognosis, TRIAL
ADVOC. Q., Jan. 1993, at 10, 10-23.
38. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
39. Id. at 402.
40. Id. at 398, 402.
41. See id. at 398.
42. See id. at 398-402.
43. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). In this case, Justice Benjamin Cardozo authored his
landmark opinion which recognized that a product supplier may be liable in negligence to
nonprivies for any defective product which may reasonably be expected to cause personal injury
if the defendant knew nonprivies would use the product. See id. at 1053-57.
44. The Moyer court cited Mai Kai, Inc. v. Colucci, 205 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1967) and
Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
45. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 399-400.
46. In Mai Kai, a metal counterweight fell from a ceiling fan and struck the plaintiff. Mai
Kai, 205 So. 2d at 292. In Matthews, a metal chair manufactured by the defendant cut off the
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only economic loSS. 47 The court did not address this difference and
instead focused on the lack of privity by stating: " '[A]ny court that
accepts MacPherson... as far as chattels are concerned should likewise
reject the privity doctrine where structures on land are involved. No
reason appears why those who design... structures on land should not
[also be liable for negligence against foreseeable third parties].' ,4
Using this rationale, the court concluded that there was no
restriction on the type of harm for which a general contractor could sue
a nonprivity architect or engineer in negligence.49 As to the duty owed
by the architect or engineer to the general contractor, the Moyer court
found that because the supervising architect has a great amount of
authority, it should have a duty to the general contractor to supervise the
construction project with due care." Specifically, the court stated,
" '[t]he power of the architect to stop the work alone is tantamount to
a power of economic life or death over the contractor. It is only just that
such authority, exercised in such a relationship, carry commensurate
legal responsibility.' "s
The Moyer court did not discuss the economic loss rule or whether
the judiciary should allocate economic risk to the general public by
allowing the contractor to sue in tort. Presumably, it did not mention the
rule because the Florida Supreme Court had not addressed the economic
loss rule or its purposes when Moyer was decided. 2 The court did
recognize that the contractor could have sued the architect or engineer
under a third-party beneficiary theory if the contract between the owner
and architect specified a third-party arrangement. 3 However, the court
did not perceive the duplicative nature of allowing the contractor tort

plaintiff's finger. Matthews, 88 So. 2d at 300. In MacPherson, an automobile collapsed,
throwing the plaintiff from the car and causing bodily injury. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
47. See Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 398.
48. Id. at 402 (quoting George M. Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and
Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 711, 713 (1959)).
49. See id.
50. Id. at 401 (citing United States ex rel. L.A. Testing Lab. v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.
Supp. 132, 135-36 (S.D. Cal. 1958)).
51. Id. (quoting Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 136).
52. The discussion of a case cited by the general contractor in a recent Washington
Supreme court case is particularly relevant here. The Washington Supreme court said this of the
cited case, which did not discuss the economic loss rule: "In cases where a legal theory is not
discussed in the opinion, that case is not controlling on a future case where the legal theory is
properly raised." Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 991
(Wash. 1994) (en banc) (citing Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)). Although not
binding, this rule could be used to argue that Moyer is not a controlling case because it did not
raise the economic loss rule.
53. See Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 402-03.
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remedies when the contractor had not earlier bargained for contract
remedies with the owner.
B. Establishing the Economic Loss Rule in Florida
Nearly fourteen years after Moyer, the court did perceive this type
of problem in FloridaPower & Light v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,'"
a case involving defective products and parties in a contractual
relationship."5 Unlike the Moyer court, the Westinghouse court focused
its attention on the fact that the plaintiff, suing in tort, suffered only
economic loss. 6 In doing so, the Westinghouse
court articulated the
57
first version of Florida's economic loss rule.
In Westinghouse, the plaintiff purchased steam generators from the
defendant. 8 When the plaintiff discovered leaks in the generators, it
sued the defendant under negligence and warranty theories, seeking
damages for the cost of repair and inspection of the generators.59 The
plaintiff argued that a negligence claim, based on traditional concepts of
duty, causation, and foreseeability, was the appropriate cause of action
to settle the dispute.' It argued that its contract with the defendant
created a legal duty on the defendant to use reasonable care in
performing the contract. It also argued that even absent a contractual

54. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
55. Id. at 900.
56. See id. at 900-02.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 900 (adopting the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' statement of the applicable
facts). The Florida Supreme Court received the case when the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
certified the following questions:
(1) Whether Florida law permits a buyer under a contract for goods to recover
economic losses in tort without a claim for personal injury or property damage to
property other than the allegedly defective goods.
(2) If Florida law precludes recovery for economic loss in tort without a claim for
personal injury or property damage to other property, whether this rule should be
applied retroactively in this case.
Id. at 899-900 (quoting Florida Power & Light v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 785 F.2d 952, 953
(11th Cir. 1986)). The Florida Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative. Id. at
900. The court responded to the second question in the affirmative, stating that the economic
loss rule applied to the instant case as well as to all other pending cases. Id. at 900, 902.
59. Id. at 900. In Westinghouse, the Florida Supreme Court answered certified questions
based only on the negligence count. See id. at 899-900. In regard to the breach of warranty
claim, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. Id. at 900.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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62
duty, the defendant had a general duty to avoid harming the plaintiff.
63
The Westinghouse court did not accept the plaintiffs arguments.
Instead, it stated that contract principles are more appropriate than tort
principles for resolving actions concerning economic loss when there is
no accompanying physical injury or damage to other property.' The
court reasoned that a duty of care, necessary for a negligence action, is
"particularly unsuited to the vagaries of individual purchasers' product
expectations., 65 Furthermore, the court reasoned that if a manufacturer
could be found liable in negligence for purely economic loss, it would
have to raise prices on every contract to cover the increased risk.'
In finding for the defendant, the court concluded that it would
refrain from "intrud[ing] into the parties' allocation of risk by imposing
a tort duty and corresponding cost burden on the public."'67 Thus, the
Westinghouse court clearly adopted the view that when manufactured
goods malfunction and cause only economic loss, purchasers must seek
recovery under contract law rather than tort law.6"
In the same year as Westinghouse, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the economic loss rule would apply to economic loss stemming
from negligently rendered services in addition to economic loss
stemming from negligently manufactured goods.69 In AFM Corp. v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,7" the plaintiff contracted

62. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the defendant negligently designed and
manufactured the generators, failed to furnish proper operating instructions, and failed to alert
the plaintiff to potential problems. Id. The plaintiff also asserted that the defendant knew that
the plaintiff was relying on the defendant's proffered expertise. Id.
63. See id. at 902.
64. See id. The court recognized that" '[t]ort law imposes upon manufacturers a duty to
exercise reasonable care so that the products they place in the marketplace will not harm persons
or property. However, tort law does not impose any duty to manufacture only such products as
will meet the economic expectations of purchasers.' " Id. at 901 (quoting Monsanto Agric.
Prods. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)).
In regard to "property damage," the court was referring to damage to any property other than
the particular product purchased. See id. at 900, 902; supra note I. Tort law has traditionally
protected against damage to other property because such damage is considered so akin to
personal injury that the two are treated alike. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 152 (Cal.
1965).
65. Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 901.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 902.
68. See id. The court also stated that the economic loss rule was not a new principle of
law in Florida and should therefore apply to all pending cases. Id. at 900, 902. Although the
basis for this proposition is unclear from the opinion, the court seemingly relied on GAF, Cedars
of Lebanon, and Monsanto. See id. at 900-02.
69. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 180-82 (Fla. 1987).
70. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
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with Southern Bell for advertising in its yellow pages." Prior to
publication, the plaintiff moved its business office.72 Because the move
entailed a change in the plaintiff's telephone numbers, the parties agreed
to use a telephone referral service to inform the plaintiff's customers of
the new number.73 When the yellow pages were distributed, the
plaintiffs old number was listed despite Southern Bell's knowledge of
the change in telephone numbers.74 To make matters worse, Southern
Bell mistakenly disconnected the referral number on two occasions.75
'The plaintiff later sued Southern Bell in tort to recover economic
losses caused by the advertising and referral mistakes.76 In denying
relief for these damages under tort, the AFM court reiterated its position
in Westinghouse, stating that contract principles are more appropriate
than tort principles for resolving economic loss in the absence of
personal injury or damage to other property.77 The court found that the
plaintiff and Southern Bell were parties to a contract which defined the
limitation of liability through bargaining, risk acceptance, and
compensation.78 Therefore, the court concluded that Southern Bell's
mistakes were redressable under a breach of contract theory but not
under a tort theory.7 9 The court reconciled its holding with the Moyer
decision, which also involved negligently rendered services and purely
economic loss, stating: "[s]ince there was no [existing] contract under
which the general contractor [the Moyer plaintiff] could recover his loss,
we concluded he did have a cause of action in tort. 80
AFM and Westinghouse established the economic loss rule: Parties
in contractual relationships must negotiate for allocation of risk and
economic loss, and cannot use tort law in its place.8 ' These cases also
asserted the policy that the court should not place the "cost burden on
the public" to pay for economic loss by imposing a tort duty for such
losses.82 Instead, the parties must contractually allocate the risk among
71. Id. at 180.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 180-81.
76. Id. at 181. The court stated that the plaintiff chose to proceed only on a tort theory
at the trial level, and that the plaintiff specifically avoided basing its tort suit on any agreement
between the parties. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove that Southern Bell committed a
tort independent of the breach of contract. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id.; Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 900-02.
82. Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 902.
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themselves, or else bear any loss individually.83 By distinguishing
Moyer, AFM also seemed to make clear that the rule only applied if
parties were in a contractual relationship, where the opportunity to
negotiate risks had been present.84 However, six years later, in Casa
Clara,5 the Florida Supreme Court held that the rule applies even if
the parties are not in privity. 6
C. Applying the Economic Loss Rule
Regardless of Privity
In Casa Clara,faulty concrete caused the plaintiffs' condominium
walls to crumble. 7 This concrete allegedly contained too much salt,
which caused steel in the concrete to rust, which, in turn, caused the
concrete to crack and break off.8 The plaintiffs sued the concrete
supplier under common law implied warranty, products liability,
negligence, and violation of the building code, even though they never
contracted directly with the supplier.89 The trial court dismissed the
claims and the district court of appeals affirmed. 9
The Florida Supreme Court agreed that the trial court had
appropriately dismissed each count.9 The plaintiffs could not recover
under breach of implied warranty because they were not in contractual
privity with the defendant.92 Also, the defendant had no duty to comply
with the building code because the code did not apply to material
suppliers like the defendant.93 Finally, the plaintiffs could not recover
the cost of fixing their homes under theories of products liability or
negligence because of the economic loss rule.94
Reinforcing its Westinghouse and AFM opinions, the Casa Clara
court applied the economic loss rule to enforce the separation of tort and
contract law.95 According to the court, the plaintiffs could not recover
under tort law because tort law seeks only to protect society from

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
See AFM, 515 So. 2d at 181.
620 So. 2d at 1244.
See id. at 1248.
Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1248.
Id. at 1248 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 1245, 1248.
See id. at 1246-48.
See id. at 1246.
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personal injury or property damage, not economic harm.96 The court
stated that when only economic harm is involved, the question
determinative of whether a tort duty should apply is " 'whether the
consuming public as a whole should bear the cost of economic losses
sustained by those who failed to bargain for adequate contract
remedies.' "" Unwilling to impose this burden on the public, the court
held that tort law does not apply in cases where the plaintiff suffers only
economic loss.9
Instead, the Casa Clara court found that contract law is more
appropriate when the plaintiff suffers only economic loss. 99 According
to the court, parties can allocate economic loss risks through contract,
and contract law serves to protect this risk allocation." ° In dicta, the
court observed that if parties were able to recover for economic loss
under tort law, warranties would become obsolete.' ' The court was
reluctant to allow the homeowners to get the benefit of a lower priced
home without warranties, then turn around and sue the concrete supplier
under negligence for economic loss."' The court concluded that "[i]f
a house [or negligently rendered service] causes economic
disappointment by not meeting a purchaser's expectations, the resulting
failure to receive the benefit of the bargain is a core concern of contract,
not tort, law."10'3 Thus, the Florida Supreme court again used the
economic loss rule to draw a line between contract and tort. 3"
Recognizing that the plaintiffs and defendant had not been in
privity because the homeowners did not contract with the concrete
supplier, the court nonetheless observed that generally, homebuyers can
bargain for warranty protections with the sellers of homes. 5 The court

96. See id.
97. Id. at 1247 (quoting Barrett, supra note 19, at 933). It should be noted that an
assumption implicit in this question is that the general public would bear the costs of economic

loss if a tort duty was imposed.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 902).
100. See id.
101. See id. (citing East River, 476 U.S. at 866).
102. See id.
103. Id. (citing EastRiver, 476 U.S. at 870).
104. Id. The court, in refusing to carve out an exception to the rule for homebuyers, noted
that several other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions, including Delaware, Illinois,
Virginia, and Washington. See id. at 1247 & n.8.
105. Id. at 1247. The court found that both "statutory warranties" and the general warranty
of habitability were available to homebuyers. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 634.301-48 (1991) and
Gable v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972)). In his partial dissent, Justice Shaw noted that the
economic loss rule
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also noted that homebuyers have the power to bargain over price with
the seller at the time of purchase, taking into consideration the presence
or absence of a warranty."' Accordingly, the court applied the
economic loss rule regardless of the absence of a contractual relationship
between the litigants."° By doing so, the court made a clear decision
to bar purely economic loss from the tort arena."'
This decision would seem to affect general contractors like the
general contractor in Moyer; however, the Casa Clara court did not
overrule Moyer."9 Instead, the Casa Clara court chose only to limit
Moyer to its facts."' The court did so without accompanying
rationale,"' creating an exception to the economic loss rule that it did
not justify." 2
Two years after Casa Clara, the Florida Supreme Court attempted
to justify the exception in Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car,
Inc."3 In Airport Rent-A-Car, the court stated that its Moyer decision

works well when the loss is suffered by one who is privy to the contract and
involves loss that was the subject matter of the contract. It works a mischief,
however, where as in this instance the injured party is not privy to the contract but
injury to third parties is reasonably foreseeable.
... In my mind, the economic loss theory was never intended to defeat a tort
cause of action that would otherwise lie for damages caused to a third party by a
defective product.
Id. at 1249 (Shaw, J., concurring and dissenting).
106. Id. at 1247. One factor both parties presumably would take into account in bargaining
over price is the extent of warranty protection the buyer negotiates to receive from the seller.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1248 & n.9.
110. Id. at 1248 n.9. In the same footnote, the court overruled several decisions which
allowed tort recovery for purely economic loss, then curtly stated, "We also limit A.R.
Moyer ... strictly to its facts." Id. The court specified the parameters of Moyer by citing AFM,
515 So. 2d at 180 (holding that a corporation could not recover purely economic losses caused
by phone company's advertising and referral mistakes); Sandarac, 609 So. 2d at 1349 (holding
that a condominium association could not sue a general contractor or an architect in negligence
to protect its purely economic loss arising out of defects in the condominium structure and
limiting Moyer to "circumstances in which the defendant architect has supervisory powers over
the plaintiff'); and E.C. Goldman, 543 So. 2d at 1270 (holding that a roofing subcontractor
could not recover purely economic loss in a negligence action against nonprivity roofing experts
and limiting the Moyer exception to cases in which there was a close relationship between the
parties). Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248 & n.9.
111. See Cara Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248 & n.9.
112. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
113. 660 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1995). In Airport Rent-A-Car, the plaintiff owned buses
manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 629. Two of the buses caught on fire while in transport.
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was based on "the supervisory nature of the relationship between the
architect and the general contractor... 4 According to the court, an
architect's supervisory responsibilities carry a concurrent duty not to
injure foreseeable parties who are not beneficiaries of a contract.1 5
However, the court did not address the fact that Moyer was decided
before Florida courts established the economic loss rule, or the fact that
the Moyer analysis was based on the privity concept and not on the
nature of harm to the injured party.
D. The Continued Survival of Florida'sException
for General Contractors
Based on Westinghouse, AFM, Casa Clara, and Airport Rent-ACar,the Florida economic loss rule holds that principles of contract, not
tort, govern claims for economic loss where there is no accompanying
personal injury or damage to property." 6 This rule is based on the
rationale that negligence is not necessary to protect purely economic loss
because parties adequately manage to allocate .economic interests by
contract.1 7 The Moyer exception to this general rule allows general
contractors to sue nonprivity supervising architects and engineers in
negligence for purely economic loss.' This exception is alive and

Id. The plaintiff did not buy the buses from the defendant, and therefore could not sue the
defendant under an express contract. Id. Rather, the plaintiff sued the defendant under a strict
liability theory for economic losses caused by the fire. Id.
On certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the
Florida Supreme Court held that (1) the economic loss rule applies to negligence claims for the
manufacture of a defective product where the only damages claimed are to the product itself,
even where the plaintiff claims to have no alternative theory of recovery; (2) a cause of action
otherwise precluded by the economic loss rule may not be maintained even if the product's
damage was caused by a sudden calamitous event; and (3) a cause of action outside the
economic loss rule does not exist where the plaintiff alleges a duty to warn which arose from
facts which came to the knowledge of a company after the manufacturing process and after the
contract Id.
114. Id. at 631.
115. Id. (citing AFM, 515 So. 2d at 181).
116. Airport Rent-A-Car, 660 So. 2d at 630; Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247; AFM, 515
So. 2d at 181; Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 902.
117. See Sandarac, 609 So. 2d at 1352.
118. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 401-02. There are other exceptions to this general rule, see supra
note 2, that are beyond the scope of this Note. For instance, accountants and abstractors may be
sued by third parties in negligence for purely economic loss under limited circumstances. See,
e.g., First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1990) (holding that an
accountant may be liable in tort for the economic loss of a third party when the accountant
personally presents and delivers statements which suggest that the third party should loan money
to or invest in one of the accountant's clients); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co.,
457 So. 2d 467, 473 (Fla. 1984) (holding that an abstractor may be liable in tort for economic
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well." 9 Florida courts continue to bar tort claims brought by
economically injured consumers," 2° but permit tort claims brought by
economically harmed general contractors.' To date, Florida courts
still have not adequately justified this discrepancy.
Ill.

THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE EXCEPTION

A. Recent Trends in Other Jurisdictions-Rejecting
the Exception
Within the past ten years, alongside full development of the
economic loss rule, several courts outside of Florida have rejected the
loss sustained by third parties when the abstractor knows that the third parties are using and
depending on the abstracts). The court in both First Florida and First American, like the court
in Moyer, did not address the economic loss rule. See First Florida, 558 So. 2d at 9; First
American, 457 So. 2d at 467.
119. See Airport Rent-A-Car, 660 So. 2d at 631 (recognizing the Moyer exception).
120. See, e.g., Palau Int'l Traders, Inc. v. Narcam Aircraft, Inc., 653 So. 2d 412 (3d DCA),
review denied, 1995 LEXIS 1488 (Fla. Aug. 30, 1995). In Palau, the plaintiff purchased an
airplane from International Airlines Holding Corportion in order to transport freshly caught fish.
Id. at 413. Prior to this purchase, Narcam Aircraft had repaired the plane and verified that it was
airworthy. Id. at 414. Six months after the plaintiff took possession of the plane, it discovered
cracks in the plane's landing gear and subsequently sued Narcam for economic losses, including
the cost of repairs to the plane, loss of the use of the plane, and consequential damages. Id. The
district court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of Narcam entered by the trial court, id. at
418, basing its decision on the economic loss rule, see id. at 416.
121. See Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5, 7-9 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
In Southland, an owner hired a general contractor to build an apartment complex. See id. at 7.
This contractor hired an engineering firm to design a retaining wall for the complex. Id. After
the wall was built, the contractor alleged that it cracked and bulged, and was not designed
consistent with appropriate professional engineering standards. Id. The contractor spent $188,000
to repair the wall, id., and subsequently sued both the engineering firm and the individual design
engineer under breach of contract and negligence theories, id. at 6.
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether the contractor could recover purely
economic loss on a negligence theory against the individual engineer, with whom it was not in
privity. See id. at 7-9. Relying on Moyer, the court determined that the economic loss rule would
not preclude tort recovery under the circumstances. Id. at 8. The court also found that the
individual engineer had a duty to "perform his professional duties in a professional, competent
manner." Id. The court concluded that whenever an engineer negligently performs an engineering
service, the engineer may be liable in tort for economic loss, even if the parties are not in a
contractual relationship. Id. at 9. In reaching this conclusion, the Southland court did not address
the underlying policies of the economic loss rule-that the law of negligence does not recognize
a protected interest in purely economic loss and that parties should allocate economic risk
through contracts.
The court also found that even if the economic loss rule was applicable, the contractor still
could recover economic loss under negligence because the faulty retaining walls caused damage
to "other property," namely, a pool deck located next to the wall. Id. at 9. For a description of
what constitutes "other property," see supra note 1.
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exception for economically injured general contractors.12 For instance,
in a 1994 case, Berschauer/PhillipsConstruction Co. v. Seattle School
District No. 1," the Washington Supreme Court held that the
economic loss rule does not allow a general contractor to recover purely
economic damages from a nonprivity architect or engineer in tort.'"
The Berschauer/Phillipsopinion addressed two contrasting lines of
opinion in Washington law, similar to current Florida law, involving the
economic loss rule and the general contractor exception." The first
line of cases, which did not discuss the economic loss rule, suggested
that general contractors could recover purely economic loss in tort from

122. See, e.g., Fleischer v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 832, 835, 837
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (disagreeing with holding in another Missouri state appeals court); Floor
Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio
1990); Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Va. 1987); Berschauer/Phillips Constr.
Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 989 (Wash. 1994) (en banc). But see Jim's
Excavating Serv. v. HKM Assocs., 878 P.2d 248, 250 (Mont. 1994) (allowing a general
contractor to sue an engineer for purely economic loss under negligent design and supervision
theories); Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordon, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463
S.E.2d 85, 89 (S.C. 1995) (same). The HKM court stated that a majority of jurisdictions have
allowed general contractors to sue nonprivity engineers in negligence for economic loss. Id. at
252. However, it supported this contention with an American Law Reports Annotation written
twenty years ago. Id. (citing Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Tort Liability of ProjectArchitect
for Economic DamagesSuffered by Contractor,65 A.L.R.3d 249 (1975)). As stated in this Note,
courts have recently abolished the exception alongside development of the economic loss rule.
See supra text accompanying note 122.
Several other jurisdictions have allowed a general contractor to recover purely economic loss
from an architect or an engineer without discussing the economic loss rule. See, e.g., CarrollBoone Water Dist. v. M. & P. Equip. Co., 661 S.W.2d 345, 353 (Ark. 1983) (holding an
engineering firm liable to a general contractor for negligence); Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra
Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378, 1381-86 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that a general
contractor could sue a design engineer in negligence for purely economic loss despite absence
of contract privity); Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 222 N.E. 752, 755 (Mass. 1967) (holding
that a general contractor could sue a civil engineer in negligence for purely economic loss but
only discussing the privity doctrine); Magnolia Constr. Co. v. Mississippi Gulf S. Eng'rs, Inc.,
518 So. 2d 1194, 1202 (Miss. 1988) (holding that a general contractor was entitled to maintain
a suit against an engineer in tort for purely economic loss based on common law duty of due
care); Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs., 489 A.2d 1233, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985) (affirming lower court's judgment in favor of a general contractor against
architects, engineers, and subcontracting engineers for the general contractor's purely economic
loss caused by negligence).
123. 881 P.2d 986 (Wash. 1994) (en banc).
124. Id. at 996. In BerschauerlPhillips,a school district contracted with the general
contractor and an architectural firm to renovate and perform new construction at an existing
elementary school. Id. at 988. After delays allegedly due to faulty architectural plans, the
contractor sued the architect for negligently preparing the plans. Id. at 988-89. After several
motions, the trial court dismissed the claim against the architect. Id. at 989.
125. See id. at 990-93.
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supervising architects and engineers. 2 6 The second line of cases
prohibited a tort cause of action for purely economic loss, but did not
involve general contractors. 27
The Berschauer/Phillipscourt concluded that precluding the general
contractor from recovering purely economic loss would "maintain the
fundamental boundaries of tort and contract law... [and] ensure that
the allocation of risk and the determination of potential future liability
is based on what the parties bargained for in the contract."'28 The court
also noted that this bright-line distinction would encourage parties to
negotiate a risk distribution that is desired or customary, preserve the
incentive to adequately self-protect during the bargaining process, and
provide certainty and predictability.'29 Furthermore, the court stated
that allowing the exception would be "incongruous" because it would
not allow economic loss recovery for an unsophisticated consumer, yet
would allow recovery for a sophisticated general contractor. 30 The
Berschauer/Phillipscourt determined that contracts entered into among
the various parties to a construction project should govern their
economic expectations, and that the preservation of the contract
"represents the most efficient and fair manner in which to limit liability
and govern economic expectations in the construction business."''
Another court, in Missouri, recently reached the same conclusion.
In the 1993 case of Fleischer v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum,
Inc.,32 the Missouri court also was presented with the issue of whether
an exception to the economic loss rule existed to allow contractors to
sue nonprivity architects.'33 The court stated that the jurisdictions that
126. Id. This Washington line of cases seems to follow Moyer and its progeny. Compare
id. at 990-91 (discussing cases which stand for the contention that purely economic loss is
recoverable against design professionals) with supra text accompanying notes 39-53 (discussing
Moyer's holding that general contractors could sue nonprivity architects and engineers to recover
purely economic loss caused by the negligent preparation of plans) and supra note 121
(discussing Southland's holding that a general contractor could recover purely economic loss
from an individual engineer with whom it was not in privity).
127. BerschauerlPhillips,881 P.2d at 990. This second line of cases seems to follow Casa
Clara. Compare BerschauerlPhillips,881 P.2d at 991-92 (discussing cases which held that
condominium owners could recover purely economic damages from builder-vendors, architects,
or building inspectors in the absence of personal injury or physical damage) with Casa Clara,
620 So. 2d at 1245-48 (holding that the economic loss rule precluded homeowners from
recovering purely economic loss from concrete supplier).
128. Berschauer/Phillips,881 P.2d at 992.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 993.
131. Id.
132. 870 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
133. See id. at 834. In Fleischer, a ship owner contracted with the plaintiffs to be
construction manager on a project. Id. at 833. The owner later entered into a separate contract
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have rejected this exception follow a more reasoned approach than
jurisdictions, like Florida, which recognize the exception." 4 The court
found that" ' "[t]he architect's duties both to owner and contractor arise
from and are governed by the contracts related to the construction
project. While such a duty may be imposed by contract, no common-law
duty requires an architect to protect the contractor from purely economic
loss." 9' ,13 Similar to the Washington court, the Missouri court also
was persuaded by the argument that imposing a duty of care on the
architect could hinder the architect's ability to negotiate risk allocation
of economic loss. 36 Thus, the Missouri court also concluded that
contract principles serve risk allocation better than tort principles in the
construction setting. 37
B. Problems with Applying the Exception in Florida
The Washington and Missouri courts recognized a fundamental
problem in applying the exception: it blurs the line between contract and
tort law which courts have sought to define clearly. Blurring this line by
permitting pure economic loss recovery in tort can lead to several
undesirable results.
First, allowing purely economic loss recovery in tort places a
burden upon society through higher prices. Specifically, architects
and engineers will insure or take other steps to protect themselves from
this heightened risk of tort liability to the general contractor. 39 This
cost is then passed on to the consuming public, raising the price of
services, and potentially pricing some consumers out of the market."'
The Casa Clara court noted that "when only economic harm is
involved, the question becomes 'whether the consuming public as a
whole should bear the cost of economic losses sustained by those who
failed to bargain for adequate contract remedies.' "..4 Another Florida

with an architect. Id. After problems with the architectural plans arose, the plaintiffs sued the

architect for economic loss under negligence theories. Id. at 834.
134. Id. at 837. The court cited other court cases that recognized the exception: an Arizona

Supreme Court case, a North Carolina Court of Appeals case, and a federal district court case
that the Berschauer/Phillipscourt found was not controlling. Id. at 837 n.2.
135. Id. at 837 (alteration in original) (quoting Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma
Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 560 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ohio 1990) (quoting Blake Constr. Co. v.
Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va. 1987))).
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See Wagner & Solomon, supra note 7, at 49.

139. Id.
140. Id. at 53.
141. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247 (quoting Barrett, supra note 19, at 933) (emphasis

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [1994], Art. 2
FLORIDA L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 46

court emphasized:
When the judiciary creates a... duty in negligence to
protect economic interests .... it should be aware that it is
not merely creating an exception to an existing common
law rule of damages. It should be convinced that the
problem justifies a judicial allocation of the relevant risks
among the members of society, and that an adequate
remedy cannot realisticallyexist through private contracts
and statutory remedies.142
In light of these considerations, imposition of a duty in negligence
for supervising architects and engineers is not justified because the
parties have the ability to enter into contracts to allocate risks.'4 3 In
fact, general contractors are often better situated to bargain for contract
risk allocation than the typical unsophisticated homebuyer represented
in Casa Clara.'"
In the typical construction setting, there is a "closed loop" of
people dealing with each other, usually including the owner, contractor,
subcontractors, and architects or engineers.'45 Generally, an owner will
contract with an architect or engineer to design plans. 46 Also, the
owner will contract with a general contractor to construct a building
according to the architect's or engineer's specifications. 47 Frequently,
one or more of the parties additionally contracts with subcontractors,
who in turn may contract with other subcontractors. 4 Consequently,

added).
142. Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1353 (2d DCA
1992) (emphasis added), review denied, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1993).
143. See Matthew S. Steffey, Negligence, Contract,andArchitects' Liabilityfor Economic
Loss, 82 KY. L.J. 659, 690 (1993-94).
144. See JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 105 (5th ed. 1994). According to Professor Sweet, an owner is often
inexperienced and finds the construction world "strange and often bewildering." Id.
145. See George A. Smith, The Continuing Decline of the "Economic Loss Rule" in
Construction Litigation, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Nov. 1990, at 1, 39.
146. SWEET, supra note 144, at 354. The traditional system separates engineering and
architectural design from construction. Id. In a "design/build" system, the architect or contractor
both designs and builds. Id. at 367.
147. Id. at 354.
148. Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., The CenterHolds: The Continuing Role of the Economic Loss
Rules in Construction Litigation, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1991, at 3, 4. Professor Sweet
discusses the chain of contracts involved in a construction setting. SWEET, supra note 144, at
107-09. According to Sweet, architects may contract with structural, mechanical, and electrical
engineers, landscape companies, interior decorators, and fire protection experts. Id. at 109. Th
owner may contract with soils engineers, expeditors, and sheet piling experts. Id. A general
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each party relies to a great extent on contracts. 49 Each is presumably
familiar with contracting, bidding, and performing construction
projects." Furthermore, a general contractor is often sophisticated in
business and experienced with contracting and the possible roles of
parties in the construction setting."'
With knowledge of contracts, the typical general contractor is able
to regulate warranty protection. There is no statutory or common law
which prevents the contractor and the architect or engineer from entering
into separate contractual agreements to allocate economic risk, or that
prevents the general contractor from contracting with the owner for
potential economic loss resulting from delays caused by a negligent
architect or engineer.' In fact, the "keystone" form contract provided
by the American Institute of Architects entitles the contractor to an
extension of time to perform if delayed by any act or neglect of the
architect.' Under this contract, the contractor may sue the owner for
damages from such delays."
Several other contractual provisions can be used to allocate
economic risk among the parties. For instance, the rule permitting thirdparty beneficiaries to enforce contracts could provide a means for a
general contractor to recover for economic loss negligently inflicted by
a supervising architect or engineer. 5 ' Under these rules, a third-party
beneficiary clause can be incorporated into the owner-architect contract
to confer beneficiary status on the general contractor. As a beneficiary,
the general contractor may be able to sue the architect or engineer
directly for economic loss under contract theories.'56

contractor may contract with suppliers and installers of structural steel, cabinetry, roofing, metal
stairs, fire sprinklers, cranes and manlifts, landscaping, window walls, painting, fireproofing,
electrical wiring, stones, toilet accessories, elevators, and custom metals. Id.
149. Barrett, supra note 148, at 4 (asserting that members of the construction industry may
depend on contracts and contract law more than members of any other industry).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 106.
152. See Steffey, supra note 143, at 681-82.
153. AMERICAN INST. OF ARcHrTEcrs, AIA DOCUMENT A201: GENERAL CoNDmONs OF
THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION art. 8.3.1 (14th ed. 1987), in 3 AMERICAN INST. OF
ARCHITECTS, THE ARCHITECT'S HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (David Haviland ed.,

1987).
154. Id.
155. Gaebler, supra note 10, at 610; see also, e.g., Legare v. Music & Worth Constr., Inc.,
486 So. 2d 1359, 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (stating that a "person not party to a contract may
sue for breach of the contract where the contract provisions clearly establish the parties' intent
to create a right primarily and directly benefiting the third party"); Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 402-03
(appearing receptive to a cause of action under third-party beneficiary theory).
156. See Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 402-03.
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Aside from using a beneficiary provision, a general contractor may
protect its economic interests by bargaining for contractual insurance
provisions." 7 The owner-contractor contract may state that the owner
must purchase insurance with the general contractor as the beneficiary
to cover damages resulting from architectural or engineering flaws. 5
Conversely, the contract may state that the general contractor will cover
such damages. 9 Finally, the parties may incorporate an
indemnification clause into their contracts." With any of these
provisions, 61project price will presumably fluctuate with economic risk
allocation.

In light of these different contractual provisions available to a
general contractor, there is no justification for courts to impose a tort
duty to protect a contractor's economic interests and to impose a
corresponding cost on the consuming public. In fact, judicial imposition
of such a "tort warranty" can frustrate the parties' efforts to allocate risk
through contract. 62 Allowing tort recovery undermines the
effectiveness of contracts by potentially imposing a higher standard of
conduct than that already bargained for by the parties. 63 Imposing a
"tort warranty" renders the contract provisions that had been bargained
for and agreed upon meaningless."6
The Casa Clara court recognized this danger of a "tort warranty"
by refusing to allow homeowners to contract for a less expensive home
without warranty protection, only to later turn around and sue for purely
economic loss through tort law. 6 In the construction setting, Florida's
exception allows a contractor to bring a cause of action in tort to

157. See Steffey, supra note 143, at 684.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Under Florida Statutes § 725.06 (1993), an indemnification clause in any constructionrelated contract is only enforceable if it either (1) contains a monetary limit on the
indemnification and this limit is part of the project specifications or bid documents, or (2) the
person indemnified by the contract gives specific consideration to the indemnitor for the
indemnification. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 690.
163. See Berschauer/Phillips,881 P.2d at 992; Steffey, supra note 143, at 698-99.
164. See Steffey, supra note 143, at 690.
165. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247 (quoting East River, 476 U.S. at 866, for the
observation that if it held otherwise, " 'contract law would drown in a sea of tort' "). The court
noted that "tort law is being used 'by litigants and courts to undermine allocations of risks
agreed to by the parties and to substitute judicial solutions for contractual arrangements that are
almost certainly superior in terms of both fairness and efficiency.' " Id. at 1247 n.7 (quoting
Jones, supra note 2, app. at 798).
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recover benefits it was unable to obtain in contractual negotiations."
Therefore, recognizing tort liability allows contractors to mischievously
avoid contract provisions, or avoid the result of not contracting at all for
architectural or engineering negligence.167
Not only does a judicially imposed "tort warranty" frustrate parties'
intent, it also fails to recognize that every construction project is
distinct. The relationships between construction parties vary with each
project." The variable nature of these relationships will be accounted
for if parties are able to contract for risk allocation, rather than having
a general risk allocation imposed by courts through a tort duty. 69
Also, maintaining the boundary between contract and tort will encourage
parties to negotiate toward a risk distribution that is desired or
customary for the particular construction project.17
Aside from recognition of parties' intent and the individuality of
construction projects, using the economic loss rule to bar contractor tort
claims for purely economic loss will have the desired effect of
preserving incentive to adequately self-protect during contractual
bargaining."' The Florida Supreme Court understood the importance
of preserving bargaining incentive in Westinghouse, AFM, Casa Clara,
and Airport Ren-A-Car. In all four cases, the court recognized that by
barring tort claims, the economic loss rule encourages parties to
negotiate economic risk and price. 72 Therefore, applying the economic
loss rule to contractors' tort claims against architects and engineers will
help preserve bargaining incentives.
Not applying the economic loss rule may have a final deleterious
effect. By allowing general contractors to use the exception, courts may
be creating liability disproportionate to the negligence committed."
An architectural or engineering firm's mistake, such as a slip of the pen,
could drive the firm out of business because delay costs can be
166. See BerschauerlPhillips,881 P.2d at 992-93.
167. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247. Professor Sweet summarized this problem: "A
contract... is a plan under which the parties agree to exchange their performance and apportion
risks in a specific manner. To disregard that plan by allowing tort claims exposes design
professionals to risks they did not plan to undertake and for which they were not paid." SWEET,
supra note 144, at 273.
Professor Sweet also noted that "parties are more likely to perform in accordance with their
promises if they have participated freely in making the exchange." Id. at 38.
168. See Steffey, supra note 143, at 690.
169. See id.
170. Berschauer/Phillips,881 P.2d at 992.
171. Id. (citing Barrett, supra note 19, at 933).
172. See Airport Rent-A-Car, 660 So. 2d at 630; Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247; AFM,
515 So. 2d at 181; Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 902.
173. See Siliciano, supra note 25, at 1944.
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exorbitant. 74 In one recent case, delay costs caused by design errors
were estimated at over $20,000,000. 17 As general contractors,
architects, and engineers are legally and practicably able to do so, they
should contract to allocate such exorbitant economic loss.
C. Arguments Supporting the Exception
The primary argument in favor of the exception rests on the vast
amount of control a supervising architect or engineer has over the
contractor.176 This control includes the power of the architect to stop
the contractor's work, which in turn can cause the contractor delay
damages.
This argument asserts that a tort duty should be
commensurate with such strong control.7 7 However, this argument
fails to recognize that parties can take this control into consideration
when negotiating contract terms. 79 Also, as mentioned below, building
codes and an architect's or engineer's business reputation will fill the
role of
keeping control in check without violating the economic loss
80
rule.1
Another argument in favor of allowing contractors to sue architects
or engineers in tort for purely economic loss is that the parties usually
are not in privity with each other, and therefore have not had the
opportunity to negotiate risk. 8' However, this argument falls in light
of Casa Clara. As stated above,'82 the Florida Supreme Court justified
its imposition of the economic loss rule regardless of privity on its
observation that the parties could have contracted with the seller for
warranty protection or to purchase insurance.'83 If the parties chose not
to do so, presumably in exchange for a lower price, they could not then

174. See City of Tampa v. Thornton-Tomasetti, P.C., 646 So. 2d 279, 280-81 (Fla. 2d DCA
1994).
175. Id. The general contractor's claim was settled for $9,500,000. Id. at 281.
176. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 401 (citing United States ex rel. L.A. Testing Lab v. Rogers &
Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 135-36 (S.D. Cal. 1958)).
177. See id. at 401 (citing Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 136).
178. Id. (citing Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 136). This is the argument upon which
the Florida Supreme Court based its decision to recognize the exception. See Airport Rent-ACar, 660 So. 2d at 631.
179. See Casa Clara,620 So. 2d at 1247.
180. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
181. See Jim's Excavating Serv. v. HKM Assocs., 878 P.2d 248, 254 (Mont. 1994)
(allowing a general contractor to recover purely economic loss for an engineer's negligent design
and supervision because the parties were not in direct privity of contract and the harm was
foreseeable).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
183. See Casa Clara,620 So. 2d at 1247.
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try to sue in tort for what they did not bargain for originally.'84 It
would be incongruous to deprive the unsophisticated home buyer of
economic damages yet allow recovery to a sophisticated contractor. 8 5
Also, allowing a general contractor to sue nonprivities for economic
loss gives that contractor more power than a contractor who is in privity
with an architect or engineer. For example, the economic loss rule
would presumably preclude a contractor who is in privity with an
architect from suing in tort because their contract would govern damage
for any loss. Giving parties not in privity more power to sue for
economic loss than parties in privity runs counter to Florida's privity
jurisprudence, which has traditionally limited a nonprivy's ability to sue
for damages.'86
A final argument in favor of the exception is that it adds safety
incentives for architects whose negligence might cause serious structural
damage.187 However, architects and engineers already have numerous
safety incentives. Both must follow Florida building codes18' and
federal standards.'89 Also, both have financial incentive to prepare
plans carefully.'"' If either does shoddy work, it tarnishes their reputation
and future revenues will decline. 9 ' Moreover, providing a safety
incentive in addition to state and federal regulations through tort liability
may have the detrimental effect of driving architects or engineers out of

184. Id.
185. See Berschauer/Phillips,881 P.2d at 993.
186. See Tribble, supra note 37, at 11-19 (tracing the history of Florida's privity doctrine).
187. A similar argument implicating safety did not work for the homeowners in Casa
Clara. The Casa Clara court disagreed with the homeowners' contention that they should be
allowed to proceed on their tort claim for purely economic damages because of the possibility
of physical injury. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1247. The court responded to this argument by
stating that it "goes completely against the principle that injury must occur before a negligence
action exists." Id.
188. Under Florida law, all plans which are required to be signed by an architect or
engineer must state "that, to the best of the architect's or engineer's knowledge, the plans and
specifications comply with the applicable minimum building codes and the applicable fire safety
standards." FLA. STAT. § 553.79(7)(d) (1993). Also, any person damaged by a building code
violation may bring a civil cause of action against the person who committed the violation. Id.
§ 553.84; see also Edward J. Seibert, A.I.A., Architect & Planner, P.A. v. Bayport Beach &
Tennis Club Ass'n, 573 So. 2d 889, 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (holding that an architect had a
duty to design a floor in compliance with the applicable building code and that his failure to do
so made him liable).
189. See SWEET, supra note 144, at 301 (noting that an architect or engineer with a
substantial supervisory position must follow federal occupational safety and health regulations
while at a construction site).
190. See Steffey, supra note 143, at 689-90.
191. Id.
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the profession."9 Further, it may cause an architect or engineer to be
too careful, which in turn could lead to mediocre design and an
unwillingness to take design risk.'93
IV. CONCLUSION

Florida courts have used the economic loss rule to maintain a bright
line between tort and contract law. This bright line is important because
it prevents the judiciary from intruding into parties' allocation of
economic risk. The bright line also keeps economic loss outside of the
tort arena because society should not bear the economic risks of
individual parties.
By allowing general contractors to sue nonprivity supervising
architects and engineers in tort for purely economic loss, Florida courts
have blurred the line between tort and contract law. As a result, the
court has intruded on the parties' contractual allocation of risk, and has
forced society to bear the burden of protecting general contractors'
economic interests. In future cases, Florida courts should recognize the
importance of maintaining the bright line in the construction setting, and
recognize that there is no justification for imposing such a burden on the
general public.

192. See SWEET, supra note 144, at 314.
193. Id. One author offers two other arguments in favor of recognizing the exception:
simplifying litigation and owner insolvency. Steffey, supra note 143, at 699-700. The author
states that "[i]n theory, to allow the contractor to sue the architect could eliminate an
unnecessary party from the claim." Id. at 700. However, the author argues that negligence
liability is a cumbersome, and potentially ineffectual mechanism for simplifying litigation. Id.
In regard to owner insolvency, the author asserts that "[t]he the issue... [becomes] whether
the law should protect contractors who fail to protect themselves." Id. The author concludes that
the prevalence of mechanics' lien laws makes owner insolvency less problematic and "alternative
rules would entail less sweeping change than importing negligence principles." Id. at 700-01 &
n. 157.
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